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Abstract:  
This article provides a theorisation of militarism in post-war Cyprus. Based, on 
qualitative empirical research conducted in Cyprus in 2011, the article explores the 
manifestation and steadfastness of Greek-Cypriot militarism, and the development of 
this militarism, which appeared after the partition of the island in 1974. In particular, it 
proposes the ideology of defence as a way to understand post-war Greek-Cypriot 
militarism. It shows the embedded nature of defence in the idea of the national struggle. 
It aims at mapping the character of this militarism in order to provide the grounds for 
future discussion. Only by understanding the interconnecting discourses that made 
Greek-Cypriot militarism possible in post-war Cyprus, can we understand its past, 
present and future.  
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1. Introduction  
Cypriot scenery is coloured by the heavy military presence on the island in the form of 
military vehicles, outposts and soldiers of six armies: the Greek Cypriot National Guard 
(NG), the Hellenic force of Cyprus (EL.DY.K), the Turkish Cypriot Security Force 
(TCSF), the Turkish Armed Forces in Northern Cyprus (KTBK), the British Forces of 
Cyprus (BFC) and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). 
Nicosia, the last divided capital in Europe remains divided into two zones of Greek 
Cypriot and Turkish armies buffered by the UN forces located in the middle.  
“As if sketched in outline upon the peaceful landscapes of the island, the silhouette of 
communal disorders […]” 
 [Lawrence Durrell - Bitter Lemons of Cyprus, 1957].  
This article argues that militarisation developed in the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) after 
the partition and was mobilised by successive governments through a specific defence 
ideology. In 1974, the country was divided into mono-ethnic Northern and Southern 
areas, and the Greek Cypriot (GC) community represented exclusively the RoC that 
controlled the southern zone. This defence ideology, the article argues, became 
formative of the GC post-war community (1974 onwards). It mobilised the community 
through specific notions of ‘threat’ and ‘masculine duty’. The political leadership and 
community ‘defended’ to avoid being perceived as feminine against the results of the 
Turkish military invasion in 1974 and thereafter occupation of Northern Cyprus 1 . 
Moreover, ‘defence’ was presented as the existential protection of the GC community 
from the Turkish army. This army was imagined as heavily threatening and hyper 
powerful.  
The article provides an inquiry into the ideology this extensive defence policy 
mobilised i.e. the ideology of defence. ‘Defence’ (in Greek: άμυνα) is the specific 
version of militarism (Huntington, 1957; Enloe, 2004) that appeared in the so-called 
‘free’ areas controlled by the RoC (hereinafter referred to as post-war Cyprus). Within 
 
1 I refer to ‘invasion’ or ‘occupation’ as contested concepts. What is understood by GCs as an ‘invasion’, 
for the Turkish Cypriot community is largely understood as ‘intervention’. The broader, and also official 
GC, understanding of the conflict situation as ‘invasion and occupation’, opposes its alternative (and 
internationally prominent) that it is a ‘bi-communal conflict amongst two ethnic communities; GCs and 
TCTCs’.  
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this nexus of militarisms, as outlined above, ‘defence’ has been one of the strongest 
discourses projected by the political leadership and state of the RoC. After the war, the 
political leadership bestowed the National Guard (NG) with the most crucial political 
and security importance turning ‘defence’ into a vast social and economic investment. 
‘Defence’ has been a type of militarism constituted by its elemental discourses of: a 
‘nation-in-arms’, and ‘high military investment’ in the face of ‘existential threat’ from 
the ‘enemy within’. Since the enactment of the 1964 National Guard Law, the NG has 
maintained, and maintains up to the present day, a conscription service, which has been 
gradually reduced over the years to its current 24-month period. This is the longest 
period of conscription service in the European Union.  
The idea of a GC masculinist defence culture developed out of the nationalist 
construction of the emasculation of the GC community by Turkey in ‘74. ‘Defence’ is 
the militarist frame of the GC national struggle. It is a distinctly and explicitly 
masculine discourse that fights feminisation in the national struggle for liberation of 
Northern Cyprus from ‘occupation’. It is central in this analysis to highlight the 
interpretation of feminisation as devaluation of a certain understanding of the national 
struggle in the GC nationalist discourse. ‘Defence’ opposes retreat and submissiveness 
of the GC ‘defensive’ and ‘assertive’ stance in the conflict. The prominent state 
mobilised slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ (in Greek: Δεν ξεχνώ και αγωνίζομαι) 
embodied precisely this engendering of GC post-war nationalism. ‘I do not forget’ 
meant I will not forget what the Turks did to Cyprus and it is ‘my’ masculine duty to 
‘struggle’ with military force for ‘defence’ and for liberation of the vulnerable 
homeland from the ‘occupying’ forces. Any attempt to negotiate or compromise was 
interpreted by all involved in this ‘struggle’ as a sign of weakness or retreat from a 
position of rightfulness and steadfastness. Thus, the broader ideology of defence was a 
defensive model of military readiness, assertion of military strength, protest of the 
‘occupation’ and the promise that the lost territory would be regained; i.e. the assertion 
of ‘not forgetting’ and continued ‘struggling’. This ‘defence’ stance was a joint effort 
by political leadership and community to avoid being perceived as weak and feminine 
in comparison with the emasculating ‘faits accomplis’ of ‘occupation’. Namely, these 
are: being invaded by Turkey- a significant military power in the Middle East; losing a 
significant part of territory with the NG defeated; and, being a small country, living in 
fear of another military offensive by Turkey -  resulting in complete occupation of the 
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island and unable to repel the Attila invading forces. The GC post-war national beliefs, 
therefore, were constitutive of this militarist identity that construes the ‘Turk’ as hyper 
masculine and extremely threatening.     
Despite its political and cultural saliences, militarism in Cyprus as an issue of inquiry 
itself has attracted little social science research. This absence is surprising given the 
high levels of militarisation Cyprus has experienced following the war of 1974. In 2013, 
Cyprus’ was classed as the sixth most militarised country in the world (according to the 
Global Militarisation Index, GDI), and, from 1990 to 2013, has generally been ranked 
between the fifth and eighth position. Still, in academic literature, the NG only appears 
in historical discussions about the appeal for union with Greece (for example, see 
Bruce, 1985; Byrne, 2000); in discussions about defence spending (Kollias, Naxakis & 
Zarangas, 2004; Kollias, 2001); and defence acquisition (Tank, 2002). Moreover, post-
war militarisation in Cyprus has been discussed in relation to the militarisation and 
engendering of a conflict heritage site: the Ledra Palace Hotel (Demetriou, 2012) and 
the relations between and amongst non-conflict British military personnel and local 
civilians (Higate and Henry, 2011). Therefore, no academic literature addresses Greek-
Cypriot militarism specifically.  
Militarism in Cyprus received a blowback after the opening of the internal borders 
between North and South (2003), the accession to the EU (2004) and cultural 
Westernization of the island. Under these new social and political parameters this is 
expressed mostly through criticism of the NG and the need for semi or fully 
professionalization of the NG (Efthymiou, 2014, 2015). Therefore, investigating GC 
militarism will help us to understand the high levels of militarisation the island has 
experienced, and most importantly bring out the character of this militarism. Thus the 
analysis of the article will create the basis for future discussion.  
Next, I provide a short account of the Cyprus Problem and the creation of the NG; a 
discussion of the ideology of defence within contemporary academic discussions on 
militarism. Building on this background the article will then discuss the development 
of the ideology of defence in Cyprus. 
2. The creation of the Cyprus National Guard 
The difficulties between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots led to excessive 
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conflict and the politics of nationhood and identity played a central role in the rise of 
inter-communal tension and the creation of the so-called ‘Cyprus problem’, (Kızılyürek, 
2002).  
In 1960, following the end of British rule, GCs and TCs accepted a compromise 
settlement that led to the creation of the RoC (Xydis, 1973) and the island became an 
independent republic for the first time since antiquity, albeit in a limited way 
(Faustmann, 1999). In 1960, Cyprus and the guarantor powers (the United Kingdom, 
Turkey and Greece) each established their own armies in Cyprus. Therefore, four 
armies were established in Cyprus as part of its independence. For the purposes of this 
article I discuss only the NG.  
The 1960, constitution provided for a police force and army for the RoC (Fisher, 2001); 
named the Cyprus Army, comprising both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. However, as a 
result of the interethnic clashes of 1963-4, the Cyprus Army was dissolved. In its place 
the NG was created consisting only of GCs and in 1964 conscription was introduced, 
(see: National Guard law (2011). This ethnic change in the composition of the army, 
therefore, was a manifestation of the deep-rooted separation developing during the 
period. In this context, the role of the permanent Hellenic Force in Cyprus stationed in 
Cyprus (EL.DY.K.) established in the Zürich and London Agreements, also changed, 
and supported the GC National Guard. In the subsequent collaboration of these two 
armies (GC National Guard and EL.DY.K.) the ‘Turk’ takes the form of the generalised 
and undifferentiated ‘other’, (Said, 1978). This is the ‘enemy’ of the “Greek nation”, 
(see Spyrou, 2011). This article will illustrate how the ‘Turk’ is, on an ideological level, 
a necessary ‘enemy’ for the NG.  
The Turkish garrison in Cyprus that remained after the Turkish invasion of Northern 
Cyprus constitutes today the 'Turkish Armed Forces in Northern Cyprus’. This garrison 
is considered by the GCs as the ‘occupation army’. In the GC nationalist imagination 
the occupying Turkish army is understood as inordinately powerful. This exaggerated 
image is used to imagine the broader idea of the ‘Turk’, thus the ‘occupying army’ is a 
GC nationalist militarist discourse of ‘othering’. Within this discourse, the idea of the 
‘Turkish Cypriot Security Force’ becomes obsolete and bestowed with little power, 
thus being viewed as less threatening. This idea of the TC force reflects the broader GC 
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nationalist discourse where ‘Turkish Cypriots are much more favorable than Turks’ 
(Spyrou 2011: 538).  
 
The NG (consisting exclusively of GCs) has only fought against the Turkish Cypriot 
community and Turkey in two minor military clashes in 1964 and 1967 and the war 
against the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. The Hellenic Force of Cyprus 
(EL.DY.K) also fought against the Turkish invaders in 1974. Since the partition, the 
NG and EL.DY.K together present the armed struggle for the continuation of the 
“Greek-ness” of the island. I will shortly discuss the methods used in investigating the 
topic of inquiry. 
3. Investigating ‘defence’ 
The article primarily presents an account of militarism in post-war Cyprus. In doing so, 
it also draws on 54 interviews and one informal discussion with refugees, which were 
conducted in 2011. During an intensive four-month period of fieldwork (11th May- 11th 
September 2011) I conducted semi-structured interviews with Cypriot men and women 
living in Cyprus, aged between 18-83 years old and from a broad spectrum of socio-
economic backgrounds; including representatives from youth sections of political 
parties and independent political youth groups, soldiers and military officers, as well as 
some members of the GC political and military leadership who were central to the 
topics under investigation. These political and military leaders included Glafkos 
Clerides, President of the RoC 1993 to 2003, Kyriacos Mauronicolas, Cyprus Minister 
of Defence 2003 to 2006, and General Pandreou (pseudonym) Major General of the 
NG and, subsequently, Adjunct to the Minister of Defence. Out of the above-mentioned 
interviews, 20 were conducted with military officers and soldiers. 15 of these were 
conducted in the NG, whilst 5 soldiers and officers were interviewed outside the army. 
Moreover, out of the 54 interviewees, approximately half were men and most were 
reservist. These interviews were conducted to understand how soldiers and military 
officers, members of the public as well as politicians and defence policy makers, 
perceive nationalism, militarism and masculinity and the meaning they create from 
these ideological practices.  
In deciding on the interview structure, I first devised a general interview guide to be  
used with the public. The thematic areas in these interviews were then used to design a 
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separate interview schedule for soldiers, officers, and an individual format for each one 
of the politicians. The main body of the interview agenda covered themes directly or 
indirectly relating to social, military, institutional and political events and processes. 
The penultimate section of the interview related to the interviewees’ hopes and 
expectations for the future of Cyprus.  
I also draw from the critical discourse analysis (Wodak, 2001) I conducted of political 
speeches, policy documents made publicly available and media sources to understand 
the projection and exemplification of discourses in relation to ‘defence’. In conducting 
critical discourse analysis, I was systematically looking to relate the structures of texts 
and talks to structures of a socio-political context (Wodak, 2001). The next section 
provides a theorisation of militarism to discuss its development in post-war Cyprus.  
4.  Theorising Militarism in Cyprus 
Militarism itself is a difficult field of study because of the varying forms it takes in 
different socio-cultural contexts. In turn, militarism is a highly contested concept 
(Cock, 1989, 2004; Sjoberg and Sandra Via 2010). Although there are many definitions 
of ‘militarism’, it is not my intention to review them here. Rather, I want to shortly 
point to some central areas of debate and then propose the argument that GC militarism 
is a synergy between institutions, culture and society and manifests itself via a 
reciprocal relationship between the military, state and community.  
In sociology, the military has been understood classically as one of the many, and basic, 
institutions of the state (Weber, 1922; Tilly, 1975; Anderson, 1993). Max Weber (1922) 
defines the modern bureaucratic state as the community, which successfully believes it 
holds the monopoly on the legitimate use of force of a certain territory. This becomes 
particularly important in the context of Cyprus where, following the withdrawal of the 
Turkish Cypriot community from the government in 1963, the GC political leadership 
strived to establish the international legitimacy of the RoC, now being controlled 
exclusively by GCs. Most symbolically, its first concrete sign of doing so was the 
establishment of the GC National Guard in 1964.  
The military is often identified with the state (see e.g. Williams, 1985) and, in effect, 
conceptualised as a discrete institutional entity (Moskos and Wood, 1988). As such, the 
emphasis is often placed on the sub-culture of the military as being alien to civilian life 
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and the features of the military are seen as a distinct set of behaviours, rules, norms, 
and values (see for e.g. Kuhlmann and Callaghan, 2011: 36). However, this 
understanding has been, on the whole, sharply criticised for attempting to demarcate 
the problem. As Thompson (1982:21) characteristically comments: we speak of ‘the 
military sector’, but this “suggests the evil is confined in a known and limited place.” 
Post-war Cyprus is another case that illustrates ‘militarisation is a social process’, 
which involves the ideological mobilisation of human, economic and political capital. 
In approaching militarism through this lens we can study the culture and ideology of 
militarism. It also enables us to better understand the way militarism is constructed, 
within and outside of the military barracks, as well as within and outside of armed 
conflict. This is because, whilst the military sector is a central point of militarism, 
militarism extends beyond the military sector. Likewise, whilst war is an essential 
condition of militarism, militarism is far broader than war. It comprises an underlying 
system of institutions, practices, values, and cultures (Sjoberg and Sandra Via 2010: 7). 
With this perspective we can understand why and how GC militarism gained political 
and cultural centrality only after the war (1974), even though it was becoming 
constructed since the bi communal clashes (1963-4)  
In this article I use the term ‘militarism’ to refer to the connecting relationships which 
constitute the process of militarisation between the ‘military as a formal state 
institution’, and the ‘militarisation of the state’ and ‘society’. Conceptualising the 
relationship between the GC military and society as bidirectional, contingent and 
conditional helps us to understand how the military reflects and represents the wider 
society at any given historical, political and cultural juncture. Thus, in investigating 
militarism, we need to direct our attention both to the military as a micro-society 
conditioned by the broader national society, and also to the modalities and perceptions 
shaped within the military that then penetrate the larger society (see: Nuciari, 2006: 
83). This GC perceived ideological and discursive formation between the army-
institution and society, following the Turkish invasion and thereafter ‘occupation’ of 
Northern Cyprus, turned the meaning of ‘defence’ into not only a militaristic issue, but 
also a central expression of the ‘fighting spirit’ pushing back the ‘occupation’ forces. 
Indeed, in the GC national struggle the army occupied the centre of collective 
consciousness, as Ben-Eliezer (1995:197) also observes about Israel. It is, therefore, 
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crucial to understand the ideology of defence because defence is an integral part of the 
national struggle that involved the whole social body. 
Consequently, I take the position that militarisation is the process by which military 
encroachments are acceptable to the population and become seen as 'common sense' 
solutions to civil problems (see for e.g. Enloe 1980). Thus, I see militarism as an 
ideology, which promotes military ideas and is achieved through persuasion, consensus 
and complicit cooperation (for e.g. Foucault, 1972 and Gramsci, 1971).  
‘Defence’ has been part of the art of governmentality (Foucault, [1978] 1991) of the 
state of the RoC, in defining its population and the mechanism of security. ‘Defence’ 
evinced a security concern for every individual and the population as a whole (Dean, 
1999: 19, referring to governmentality). Thus ‘defence’ concerns practices of 
government and self as it becomes part of “the organized practices through which we 
are governed and through which we govern ourselves.” (ibid: 18).  
‘Defence’ (in Greek: άμυνα) is a language and a framework of thinking about the links 
between  government, authority, and politics, and questions of identity, self and person 
(Dean, M 1999:13). Consequently, we need to analyse the macro-level because it has 
constituted and mobilised the politics of ‘defence’. The micro-level is equally important, 
as power is a part of everyday routines and practices, appropriated by macro-powers 
such as the state. 
The embedded nature of militarism in society was built on a discursive frame of a 
specific military model. Post-war Cyprus presents a case of what we can call ‘nation-
in-arms’ (Rapoport, 1962; Ben Eliezer, 1995). This is because the fully conscript NG 
entirely depends on recruiting soldiers from society. The creation of the NG, therefore, 
brought with it a ‘nation-in-arms’ in the form of conscription, reserve and militia 
service, which today includes men from the ages of 18 – 55, (see: National Guard law, 
2011). Thus, almost every GC family is affected by the military and has a ‘militarised 
wing’; i.e. has a son as a soldier or reserve or a husband as a reserve or militia. As the 
next section will illustrate, militarism operating through a ‘nation-in-arms’ model 
consolidates the links between the army and society. The ideology of defence 
strengthens these links.  
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This article draws on specific political, cultural and social discourses, which bind 
together Cyprus society to the NG. These are argued to be:  
 The formulation of a perceived threat by Turkey in relation to another military 
offensive.  
 The orientation of public opinion of ‘threat’ towards the significance of defence. 
 The development of the ideology of ‘defence’ and ‘nation-in-arms’ as a 
response to threat.  
 The reproduction of collective representations of ‘citizen-soldier’ and 
‘everyday ordinary heroes’. 
As outlined so far, militarisation puts forth conflicting understandings of what it means 
and how it can be measured. Whether one measures the level of militarisation through 
qualitative or quantitative indicators, taking into account military expenditure, the 
number and sophistication of the weapons systems in relation to the population, the 
influence of the military over society or the involvement of the larger society in the 
‘military project’, Cyprus remains a highly militarised society. The high levels of 
militarisation I illustrate in the next section rely on the strong reciprocal relationship 
between the military and society.  
 
5. Constructing a nation-in-arms: Ordinary men and militarisation  
‘Defence’, the version of militarism developed in Cyprus following the events of 1974, 
can be clearly seen in the deeply entrenched commitment of the population to its idea 
as a ‘nation-in-arms’. The construction of post-war Cyprus as a ‘nation-in-arms’ has 
been instrumental in the pursuit of the ideology of defence by the political leadership 
as it has asserted the state of the RoC with the construction of the community as a 
‘nation-in-arms’2.  
The ‘nation-in-arms’ army depends on the extensive length of the conscription and 
reserve service. The political leadership, as part of the effort to reproduce its legitimacy 
against the ‘occupation’, marshalled human resources to create a ‘nation-in-arms’ that 
 
2 This particular relationship between society, state and armed forces that asserts the state as a masculine 
militarist entity has been also repeatedly identified in other post-armed conflict divided societies, (for 
example, Israel, see Ehrich, 1987).  
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would have defended the community. The NG is an army of nearly 100,000 soldiers 
(conscripts, reserves and militia) and officers, (see European Defence Agency (EDA)). 
Therefore, at any time the NG involves 12% of the total population of the RoC in its 
operations 3. In more detail, the NG is estimated to consist of 10,000 conscripts, 70,000 
reserves and militia (50,000 of whom are readily available) and 12,500 military 
personnel, (see EDA).  
This was part of a bigger effort to lead a nationalist politicisation of the mass army 
within society. It did so through attempting to solidify the ‘Greek-Cypriot ethnic 
community’ needing to defend its existence. In other words, the embedded nature of 
the ‘existential threat’ from Turkey within society was an integrative effort by the 
political leadership to culturally homogenise an ‘ethnic community’ as a ‘nation-in-
arms’. Therefore, this ideology that had the necessity for a GC masculinist defence 
culture, was contingent on the idea of the community as emasculated by the enormous 
military of Turkey. Thus, Cyprus needs to be militarised throughout because of hyper-
masculinised Turkey, now threatening its overall existence.  
 
This point was reiterated in the interview I conducted with General Pandreou, who 
commented that the GC community needed to create the NG (and thus also the 
accompanying ‘nation-in-arms’), in order to face the Turkish expansion policy and the 
fact that Turkey wanted to occupy the entire island of Cyprus. This nationalist and 
masculinist militarist expression became the main institutional message, as well as the 
socio-political mechanism for the construction of ‘defence’ and protest against the 
‘occupation’ (I struggle). Thus, the post-war nationalist discourse justified the 
continuation of this vast masculinist investment in military terms, touching upon the 
‘existential threat’ for the continuation of the GC community. In such ways, the culture 
of militarism and the broader masculinist commitment of the community into the idea 
of itself as a ‘nation-in-arms’, underscored the effeminate tendencies of circumstance. 
A similar culture of militarism has appeared in different cultural contexts, for example 
in India and Ireland (see Banerjee, 2012).  
 
 
3 In the last census (2011), the population of Cyprus was slightly more than 800,000 (exactly: 838,897), 
(see Statistical Service Republic of Cyprus).  
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The feminised notion of Cyprus is specifically based on the idea of the ‘enormous 
enemy within’ (Kanaaneh, 2013), which invaded the distinctively small Cyprus with 
brutality and now occupies a significant part of territory. With Cyprus unable to repel 
the invasion Turkey wants, and is able to, occupy the whole of the island. Thus, 
‘defence’ was presented to the population as ‘existential protection’. However, the 
political aim of ‘defence’ was to construct a diplomatic strength. The purpose was to 
provide defence against another Turkish attack to delay the process and appeal to the 
international community to intervene. These points of the relationship between the 
appeals to the international community and internal response of defence were made in 
an interview I conducted with Glafcos Clerides, who was President of the RoC (1993- 
2003), and acting President of the RoC  (role was President of the Parliament of the 
RoC) when the invasion took place. While discussing his efforts to advance the NG in 
the period before and after the invasion he commented that the purpose of the force was 
to delay the Turkish military forces for 20 – 30 days and not allow them to occupy the 
whole of the island until the UN could interfere and oblige them to start negotiations.  
 
The implementation of the ‘nation-in-arms’ military model by the state was intended to 
constitute the whole of Cyprus as an armed militarised platform of resistance in the face 
of another armed event with Turkey. A clear illustration of the state effort to mobilise 
the population into the ‘nation-in-arms’ model is the extensive and lengthy male 
conscription and reserve service from the ages of 18 to 55. This notion of the need for 
the community to be involved in ‘defence’ was also clearly laid out in the revised 
National Guard law 2011 that provides for the sustenance of conscription. The military 
idea is that current young male conscripts will provide resistance against the first 
‘enemy attack’, whilst the older 70, 000 reserves, the backbone of the force, are 
mobilised. To the present day, most reserves and militia have in their house a military 
gun, usually a G3 military riffle, and ammunition as well as other weaponry according 
to rank and specialization. This means that almost every house in Cyprus contains 
military guns of the NG. As a prominent slogan mobilised by Vassos Lyssarides, a 
central figure in Cyprus politics in the post-war years, goes ‘every home a castle, every 
patriot a soldier’ (in Greek: κάθε σπίτι και κάστρο, κάθε πατριώτης και στρατιώτης).  
Moreover, a clear example of the state effort to mobilise the population to the 
importance of ‘defence’ and thus mobilise complicit cooperation into the ‘nation-in-
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arms’ is the amount and specificity of defence broadcasts on state television. ‘Defence’ 
and ‘the army’ are words often used in the Cypriot media. The NG and defence issues 
still appear on mainstream media almost on a daily basis. Characteristically, a TV 
programme entitled ‘Defend your Country’ (in Greek: αμύνεσθαι περί πάτρης), focuses 
exclusively on Cyprus’ defence issues and news from within the force; it runs to the 
present day on the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (RIK) channel. Therefore, 
although ‘defence’ was an ideology mobilised by the state and exemplified through the 
NG, it “became a part of the way people live both inside and outside military barracks” 
(Enloe, 2000: 3-4). It involved and appealed to the entire social body that considered` 
national survival as an urgent existential priority, committed to defending the 
threatened and vulnerable homeland; ‘I do not forget and I struggle’. Then, ‘defence’ 
has been embedded into the public understanding of the ‘national struggle’, and 
‘ontological security’ (Giddens, 1990: 92) against the ‘existential threat’. The next 
section will look deeper into how ‘defence’ took part in the national struggle.  
 
5.1. ‘Keep struggling’ 
The memories of the war, the division of the island, and the territories lost - all 
reproduced through popular discourse - connected the ideology of defence with the 
cultural means by which it was constructed. ‘Defence’, the ‘army’ and notions of 
‘returning back’, were part of cultural militarism (as Ben-Eliezer, 1995 and Kimmerling, 
1993, argue in relation to Israel). In the GC community, the legitimacy of the national 
struggle was dependant on the association with military goals, (Enloe, 2004: 145). The 
centrality of the demand for ‘justice’ and the end to the violations of ‘human rights’ in 
relation to the war events and ‘occupation’ in public and political discourse (see: 
Demetriou, 2005) created a naturalisation of the need for defence. Thus, the idea of the 
masculinist defence culture was a discursive cultural basis of steadfastness for the 
rightfulness of the GC community emasculated by Turkey. In this way, whilst the 
community is emasculated by the constant Turkish threat, the NG constitutes the 
protector of what is left of the country's 'virtue' by being highly masculinist. Within this 
masculinist defence culture, the post-war body politic focused on and demonstrated 
virility and prowess in the national struggle through its construction of a ‘nation-in-
arms’.  
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Moreover, the protection of the population was built into the ‘existential threat’ within 
the discursive system the political leadership created and mobilised by embedding 
militarism in society. The state and its representatives (just like in Israel, see Ehrlich, 
1987) used the ‘existential threat’ by systematically repeating it, to coerce the 
continuous commitment of the community to ‘defence’. Certain post-war discourses 
acted as compulsive reminders of the country being under constant threat of another 
invasion from the ‘occupation-army’ thus constituting discursive callings for staying 
committed to ‘defence’.  
The political leadership calling for the need to defend was illustrated to the community 
through specific gender symbolisms, which were centrally mobilised through state 
institutions. A key example of this is the portrayal of the mothers, wives and sisters of 
missing persons as a symbolic means to project and sustain the notion of Cyprus as a 
victim of the ‘enemy’ (Yakinthou, 2008). Such feminine articulations of powerlessness 
and victimcy of Cyprus appeared as they were co-constituted with a gender angle 
alongside the iconography of this ‘enemy’, in dangerous hyper-masculine terms. An 
example of this is the poster named ‘Attila’s boot’, which, in addition to other places, 
was present in public school classrooms. The poster illustrates a Turkish soldier during 
the events of the invasion (1974) mercilessly attacking the whole of Cyprus whilst 
stepping with vigour on a GC soldier. This Turk is pictured as the militarily gargantuan 
being able to invade the whole island with brutality. This graphic illustration produced 
by the state depicts the nationalist rhetoric of the hyper powerful ‘Turkish army’ able 
to infiltrate the GC existence, calling for the need for it to be halted. These discourses 
portray post-war Cyprus as a feminised victim in need of protection and deliverance. 
They are responded to with the masculinist ideology of ‘defence’ and the need for the 
community to stay committed to ‘defence’. Masculinity and femininity are formulating 
discourses of the ideology of defence. 
5.3. Keep struggling: You Man or Woman! 
Defence provided a clear separation of gender roles, integral to its reproduction. The 
closed-border, which has been open since 2003, was the platform on which the co-
constitution of masculinity and femininity of the post-war nationalist discourse was 
manifested and illustrates how both GC men and women were ideologically engaged 
in the symbolism and defence of the ‘mother victim’ Cyprus. The guarding of the 
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border was a promise of the heroic praxis of the ‘nation-in-arms’; that the vulnerable 
GC community would remain whole in the face of the ‘enemy-within’. Therefore, while 
the idea of the mothers and wives of the missing persons on the border holding the 
photos of their loved ones served as an ideological mobilisation of sustaining the 
memory of the trauma suffered by Cyprus (‘I do not forget’) men had another role to 
undertake; defending and protecting the “nation” whilst fighting for liberation, (‘I 
struggle’).  
In GC society the exemplification and honouring of the acts of certain national heroes 
of previous national struggles (mainly the anti-colonial struggle of EOKA 1955- 1959 
and the Greek war of independence against the Ottoman rule 1821), though part of the 
cultural ideological basis of the national struggle, have been discourses of an assertive-
defensive militarism. Thus, the remembrance of these heroic figures asserted in popular 
discourse the moments of revolution in which masculinist military endeavours assured 
the national “self”-assertion. Thereby becoming ideologically conductive to a heroic 
praxis of the GC everyday organised, mobilised and technologically advanced type of 
‘nation-in-arms’ against the hyper masculinised ‘enemy-within’.  
This heroic masculinity was exemplified in the national struggle through the 
understanding of ‘everyday ordinary heroes who serve their military service, then 
become reserves and then militia (I struggle). Thus ‘defence’ has been an everyday 
consumed ideology. Women, as discussed above, acquired the role of memory keepers 
(I do not forget), supporters of the struggle and pain bearers. The next part of the article 
illustrates the governmental policies and state mechanisms that mobilised the ideology 
of defence.  
5.4. The state and the development of ‘defence’ 
‘Defence’, the version of militarism developed in Cyprus after 1974, is a focal 
mechanism of the relationship the successive governments of post-war Cyprus 
mobilised between their international and internal agenda. The ideology of defence has 
been the internal front of the Janus-faced international and internal agenda of the RoC. 
Following the invasion and division of the island, the political leadership has been 
portraying internationally the state as a victim in ‘existential need’ of the international 
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community, and internally as the ‘defensive’ potent saviour of the victim GC 
community from the hyper powerful ‘Turkish army’.   
 
 
The bi-communal clashes with Turkish Cypriots in 1963-64 led to the state of the RoC 
being controlled only by GCs. This has given “GCs complete control over the 
governance of the country in the eyes of the world” (Ker Lindsay, 2008: 109). The 
projection of the conflict by GC political leadership to the international community 
connected the ‘division’ with ‘injustice’ for the GCs (Bryant, 2001). This, in turn, 
meant a solution based on the recognition of the GC leadership as the only legitimate 
government on the island (Demetriou, 2005: 11). Through this GC discourse the 
political leadership appealed to international bodies such as the United Nations and, 
later on, to the EU for foreign support and political intervention.  
 
Nationalism and militarism are discourses that often invoke images of the feminine 
victim and masculine protector, which coincide with broader patriarchal structures of 
active masculinity of the fighter versus the passive femininity of the victim (for 
example see Massad's 1995 discussion on Palestinian nationalism). This discrepancy is 
central to the conceptualisation of the GC national struggle. In the most dominant 
nationalist discourses following the division of the island, Cyprus was presented to the 
international community “as small and unprotected, a little Cyprus (i mikrí Kípros) 
suffering from the unjust bullying of a Turkey with a large and vicious army at its 
disposal” (Demetriou, 2005: 16). The projection of post-war Cyprus by successive 
governments to the international community as a victim was internally constitutive of 
the masculinist post-war internal politics of: ‘We have been victims but we can still 
win; we will defend ourselves’. Certain results of the war, including the population 
displacement and the cases of missing persons, were part of the nationalist gendering 
of post-war Cyprus that was strongly projected to the international community. It 
ventured the image of Cyprus as a victim suffering from the violation of human rights 
and injustice at the hands of Turkey. This symbolisation of the nation as a victim and 
in need of protection was depicted through the metaphor and image of a suffering 
woman awaiting liberation (Anthias, 1989: 155) and exemplified through the idea of 
the mothers of the missing persons (Yakinthou, 2008).  
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The centrality of this gendering of GC post-war nationalism (Hadjipavlou, 2006) was 
mobilised by the state through the slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’, which received 
overwhelming support (Christou, 2006). Whilst ‘I do not forget’ was an active policy 
with great appeal and support amongst the public, it also provided the platform for the 
existence and purpose of the army; i.e. you are not going to ‘forget’ because you are 
going to ‘defend’; one justified the other. Thus, the iconic image of mothers of the 
missing persons has a symbolic function for GCs to remember a certain image of the 
state as a victim (Efthymiou, 2011). This projection has been internally constitutive of 
self- ‘defence’.  
For the GC community, ‘defence’ is a national promise that the ‘fighting spirit’ for the 
liberation of Cyprus would be sustained against overwhelming odds. In the ever-present 
scenario of a second invasion, the well-equipped and technologically advanced NG, 
with the will of the whole of the male population to sacrifice their lives, will hold back 
the ‘overly powerful enemy’. Thus the ‘male population’ will protect the continuation 
of the ‘Greek-Cypriot existence’ on the island, until the international community 
becomes involved. Consequently, the ideology of ‘defence’ made the border the NG’s 
first priority, ensuring that the ‘enemy within’ would not cross and occupy the rest of 
the island. This was further symbolically illustrated in the force by the ever-present 
slogan: ‘A Good Turk is a Dead Turk’, i.e. no Turk alive will cross that border. 
Theorising the borders that exist in Cyprus in this way leads one to notice the 
significance they were given by GCs to the integrity and continuation of their existence. 
Concurrently, within this ideological script, the importance of men’s military 
conscription to GC masculinity (and femininity) was set against what is threatened and 
needing to be protected.  
The ideology of ‘defence’ was reflected in the 112-mile long border, dividing the island, 
heavily guarded by the two opposing armies. The border in Cyprus presents an 
uncommon situation as it signified the need for ‘defence’ from its creators but also the 
protest against its existence (I struggle). The national goal, as also clearly evoked 
through the official and unofficial discourses of the national struggle, was that these 
borders would one day be overthrown and the ‘enemy within’ would be thrown out of 
Cyprus. As one of the most popular GC post-war slogans says: ‘All Turks out of Cyprus’ 
(In Greek: Έξω οι Τούρκοι από την Κύπρο), giving out the message that by achieving 
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the expulsion of the Turks GCs will, in some way, regain what was lost. Thus, the 
ideology of defence provided a military ‘defence’ and ‘kinetic’ force against the borders. 
Kinetic in the sense that the NG maintains a strong ‘fighting spirit’ with the goal of 
liberating the ‘occupied’ Northern part of Cyprus to enable the refugees to return back 
to their homes. Ultimately, in this discursive space of victimised, national self-
understanding anchored around ‘I do not forget and I struggle’, ‘defence’ has operated 
as a predominant form, existing through ‘struggling’.  
The idea of the GC national struggle did not merely involve the political struggle to 
bring the ‘occupation’ of Northern Cyprus to an end, but required the commitment of 
the complete social body. For example, anti-occupation marches and protests, which 
have been held extremely frequently following the division of the island, were 
organised by a widest spectrum of political and social factions of Cypriot society. 
Another significant commitment by civil society has been the annual student anti-
occupation overnight protest on the borders, which involves all schools across the 
country, and the annual Cyprus Federation of Motorcyclists march. Moreover, the 
strongest commitment of the community to the national struggle is illustrated by 
“letting” one’s son and/or husband (if between the ages of 18 and 55) be conscripted 
into the NG as soldier, reserve or militia (see National Guard Law, 2011). Even women 
are conscripted in civil defence when they turn eighteen and men, following their 
discharge from the militia service at the age of fifty-five, support the civil defence (see 
Civil Defence Law 1998). Therefore, this version of militarism appeared in post-war 
Cyprus as a necessary militaristic measure of the ‘fighting spirit’ and became the most 
central manifestation of the nationalist response to the ‘occupation’ of Northern Cyprus.  
‘Defence’ actualised the ‘national struggle’.  
 
 
5.5. ‘Investing’ in the face of the ‘existential threat’  
The armed forces were presented as a way in which the political leadership had 
established and reproduced the legitimacy of the state of the RoC  (Weber, 1978; Tilly, 
1975; Giddens, 1985) against the already established emasculation of the GC 
community. Within this ideological mechanism the state and its representatives used 
the sense of ‘existential threat’ to gain and maintain legitimacy and to define standards 
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for the distribution of resources. The state projected its defensive military prowess 
through the extensive procurement and presentation of arms and the technological 
modernisation of the armed forces (see Lima, 2014: 272, who describes a similar 
conceptual intersection between the development of the idea of defence and 
modernisation in Brazil). Major arms procurements are a significant sign of the 
militarisation of a national culture. The post-war political era was characterised by 
major defence procurements, especially in the 1990s, the most prominent and popular 
example being the purchase of the surface-to-air defensive S300s missiles from Russia 
in 1998.  
‘Defence’ inextricably gave rise to the preparedness for another Turkish military 
offensive and this idea of the preparedness of the ‘nation-in-arms’ was used to divert 
excessive resources towards ‘defence’. The ‘economic miracle’ Cyprus experienced in 
the post-war years made possible the diversion of extensive resources for military uses 
(Gergakopoulos, 1999; Kammas, 1992). In 1991, the defence budget reached its highest 
peak of 9.1% of GDP. Defence spending is an everyday reality for GCs living in Cyprus 
who pay ‘defence tax’ in almost all of their financial transactions4. In Cyprus, there is 
defence budgetary spending and off-budget expenditure. The latter includes capital 
expenditures, notably arms purchases. Off-budget expenditures are disbursed from a 
defence fund financed by a special defence levy. In addition, private companies and the 
Church of Cyprus, considered to be one of the wealthiest institutions on the island, are 
said to also contribute directly to the fund.5 Moreover, the development of the ideology 
of defence has gone through changes. One of the most significant events in its 
development has been the state-led doctrine with Greece, discussed below.  
 
5.6. Single Area Defence Doctrine Cyprus - Greece  
 
 
4 GCs living in Cyprus pay ‘defence tax’ in most of their financial transactions. This is a levy called the 
‘Special Contribution for defence tax’, based on the Special Contribution for defence law (Number 
117(Ι)/2002). This law provides that any income is subject to a special contribution for defence 
(including dividends, interest and rents, where the entire taxable income is subject to a special levy), (see: 
Cyprus Inland Revenue Department).  
5 Also, receipts from increased taxes on gasoline and cigarettes are to be deposited in the defence fund.  
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The creation of the Single Area Defence Doctrine with Greece (In Greek: Ενιαίο 
Αμυντικό Δόγμα Ελλάδας-Κύπρου, hereinafter SADD) is a significant event in the 
development of the ideology of defence. It is a state-led doctrine that reproduces the 
nationalist idea of a Greek ethnic community – Cyprus together with Greece - that will 
‘defend’ itself. The doctrine was developed during the 1990s, a time when both Cyprus 
and Greece had a strenuous military antagonistic relationship with Turkey. This 
included a number of events, such as the Greek-Turkish military crisis surrounding the 
Aegean dispute (1987), the Greek-Turkish military Imia crisis (1996) and the  Cypriot-
Turkish crisis after the Turkish killing of two GC refugees on the borders (1996). 
 
The doctrine is a territorial military union developed in the 1990s seeking to expand 
the GC defence and military capabilities in relation to Turkey, with military defence 
cooperation between Cyprus and Greece. Most importantly, the union provided for a 
solicited cooperative joint reaction from both armies in case of a potential attack by 
Turkey in the area of the Cyprus and Greek states. In nationalist popular discourse 
SADD was perceived as strengthening Cyprus’ defence by creating the enlargement of 
military borders with the area covered by both the Cypriot and Greek states considered, 
for ‘defence purposes’, unified. Thus it was perceived as a defence shield for Cyprus 
who would no longer have to present a defence force alone against Turkey.  
 
The idea of a unified defence becomes concrete during the same period when the NG 
became modernised and well equipped. Also, military infrastructures were created in 
Cyprus, specifically to be able to accommodate and be used by specific divisions of the 
Greek Armed Forces. This included naval and air bases, even though Cyprus does not 
have any warships or air force. Worth noting is the completion of the first and only 
military airport of Cyprus named by Greece prime minister A. Papandreou, who first 
had the idea for the single defence doctrine. Since Cyprus does not have any military 
aircraft, the purpose of creating a military airport in Cyprus was so that Greek military 
aircraft could have presence in Cyprus. The SADD provided for structured 
collaboration at many levels, including coordination between the headquarters of the 
NG and Greek Armed Force and joint military exercises (namely, Nikhforos, In Greek: 
'Νικηφόρος', and 'Toxotis', 'Sagittarius'). Moreover, it was the increase in Cyprus’ 
defence spending under the SADD that illustrated the determination for ‘defence’.  
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Defence spending between 1988-99 rose significantly to 5.9% of GDP when compared 
to the previous period: 1.8% during 1975-86. Thus, compared to the previous 11-year 
period defence-spending rose by 327%. To highlight the significance of this percentage 
defence spend further, the United States in 1999 spent 3% of its GDP, whereas the 
United Kingdom spent only 2.4%. The most noteworthy amounts spent on defence in 
Cyprus were between 1990-2 with an average of 7.93% of GDP6. This change in 
defence policy is also reflected by the sharp rise of arms imports, which, as a share of 
total imports during the 1987- 1997 period, rose by more than 300% (3.35% of the 
GDP), when compared to the previous ten-year period (1977- 1987), (see: UN military 
expenditure data).  
 
This increase in arms procurements as part of the SADD signified the new defence 
policy aiming for the further advancement of the military capabilities of the NG in 
cooperation with the Greek military forces against Turkey. As a popular saying that 
appeared in the national media of both countries goes: ‘Every gun that strengthens the 
defence of Greece strengthens the defence of Cyprus also’ (In Greek: Κάθε όπλο που 
ενισχύει την άμυνα της Ελλάδας ενισχύει και την άμυνα της Κύπρου).  
The SADD had importantly raised the militarist fighting spirit in Greece and Cyprus. 
An important symbolism was that the word "Cyprus" was added, in 1994, to the Tomb 
of the ‘Unknown Soldier’ (which rests exactly in front of the Greek Parliament) 
illustrating that now Cyprus is part of the Greek struggle. This is perhaps the most 
central monument in Greece that represents the struggles of the Greek nation. A 
symbolic manifestation of this “Greek struggle” under the SADD was an operation 
voluntarily conducted by members of the National Association of Greek Reserve 
Commando Forces, in 1997, named "Kimon 97" (In Greek: "Κίμων 97"). The Greek 
reservist groups sent 5 inflatable boats to transfer the Acropolis flame from Athens to 
Paralimni (Cyprus) where the motorcyclists march Berlin - Paralimni was going to end, 
an event which resulted in the killings of two Greek-Cypriots on the borders at the 
hands of the Turks. The head of Mission, noted, "[w]ith our project we wanted to prove 
by action in all directions our love to the Hellenism of Cyprus and that 'Cyprus is near', 
 
6 See: UN military expenditure data and Stockholm International Peace Institute for detailed data on 
defence spending.  
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is defensible and defended.” (Eleftherotipia, 1997). This nationalist assertion of an 
‘existential need’ for the defence of Cyprus was constitutive to the construction of the 
GC community as a ‘nation-in-arms’. However, as the next section will reveal, socio-
political developments in recent years has led to the weakening of the ideology of 
‘defence’. 
6. Depleting Defence; ‘nation-in-arms’ in nostalgia 
The changing national struggle has contributed to the weakening of the ideology of 
‘defence’ (Efthymiou, 2015, 2016). The accession of Cyprus to the EU (2004) has 
marked a new turning point in the GC ‘struggle’. This is a shift in the perception of the 
national struggle towards a more diplomatic approach, through EU pressures on Turkey 
(Demetriou, 2008; Bryant, 2004; Yakinthou, 2009), as well as collaborations with 
stronger military powers (Efthymiou, 2016), rather than military ‘defence’ and ‘kinetic’ 
force. Moreover, the GC community, which is now sheltering under the EU political 
family, began to undermine the notion of ‘existential threat’ as it came to understand 
that a second invasion of Cyprus by Turkey was most unlikely, as this would have 
meant an attack on the whole of the EU. Furthermore, the opening of the internal 
borders between North and South (2003) and the ‘enemy-within’ crossing them, having 
not resulted in any violent clashes in the 14 years following the opening, further 
contributed to the weakening feeling of ‘existential threat’. The ‘existential threat’ was 
the focal point for the construction of the ideology of defence and the guarding of the 
previously un-crossable border from the threatening Turkish army was the main 
purpose of the ‘nation-in-arms’. 
The successive governments, focused on a new idea of defence, whilst allowing for the 
mechanics of the ‘older defence’ to decompose. The changing ‘national struggle’ 
brought with it the ‘defence’ politics of building relationships with larger political 
entities. ‘New Defence’ is essentially security through sheltering within the auspices of 
the EU political family and forming relationships with stronger military powers 
(Efthymiou, 2016). A key aspect of these developments is the territorial borders of the 
sea between the North and South divide, which did not previously acquire such national 
significance for GCs in the conflict situation. They appear now to be the new border 
against which ‘defence’ predominantly manifests itself in relation to ‘occupation’. Thus 
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the marine territorial borders are replacing the previous importance of the inland border 
(see: Efthymiou 2016). 
In the scope of these social, political and military developments the successive 
governments adopted a policy of disinvestment in the NG, which has further 
undermined its concomitant ‘nation-in-arms’ (Efthymiou, 2014). This policy began in 
the context of the ‘Europeanisation of the conflict’ (Demetriou, 2008; Yakinthou, 2009) 
and the coordinated bilateral reconciliatory efforts with Turkey, since the opening of 
the borders (2003) and the soon after UN Annan Plan for reunification (2004). This is 
evident, amongst other examples, in the dramatic decrease of the defence budget since 
2003 which also meant the end to major military procurements. Moreover, the repeated 
cancellation of certain military parades and exercises 7  and significant changes of 
ideology in the training of conscripts, such as the removal of masculinist nationalist 
chanting shows a ‘stepping back’ from a nationalist assertion of militarist politics of 
the ideology of defence. The politics of ‘new defence’ also created uncertainty around 
whether the SADD Cyprus – Greece  (the high point of military struggle against Turkey) 
is still in place.  
In the backdrop of a disorientated ideology of defence, the masculinist nationalist 
project of defence is today weakening in Cyprus. The synergy of the socio-political 
developments with the lack of political vision about the modern army led to the 
disengagement of the community from its idea as a ‘nation-in-arms’. The ideology of 
defence was not re-adapted under these new developments. As such, the social 
‘stepping back’ from ‘defence’ can be clearly explained at the level of ideology by 
considering that the men who were to be conscripted into the NG in the coming years 
were faced with these particular conflicting ideas; ‘occupation’ i.e. needing to defend 
the border and open-borders and the ‘enemy within’ crossing them versus the 
possibility of reunification supported by the intensified negotiations, a society that feels 
relatively safe under the protection of the EU, political neglect of the NG and an 
ideologically disoriented and undermined force. These conflicting understandings 
meant that draft dodging rapidly became an exponential phenomenon and the discipline 
 
7 Such as the abolition of the annual joint GC military exercise 'Nikihforos' (In Greek: 'Νικηφόρος') and 
Greek exercise "Toxitis" (in Greek: Τοξότης), since the two were held together, in conjunction with the 
abolition of the Turkish military exercise "Bull" (In Greek: Tαύρος).  
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in the reserve forces became weakened. The strong rise of the phenomenon signalled a 
clear cultural shift from the collective project of masculinist solidarity of the defence 
of the country to the individuals’ own personal goals and understanding of success. It 
did, however, also show the attenuation of the state’s capacity to mobilize those groups 
who were the carriers of the national defence project. The community, whilst it is 
‘letting go’ of its commitment to ‘defend’ is also, in general terms, in disapproval of 
the political irresponsibility that led to the disintegration of the country’s defence.  
Today, the inability of successive governments to deal with the internal defence issues 
the disintegrating ideology of defence has created is evident. The phenomenon of draft 
dodging pertains (SigmaLive, 2013 and 2014), despite repeated efforts to deal with it. 
More generally, however, these developments have contributed to a crack in the popular 
acceptance of military service as a man’s duty to GC society and, in synergy with other 
factors, such as the strong favouritism and nepotism within the force, have led to the 
erosion of the sacred status once enjoyed by the NG. New questions have arisen for the 
public in and around a variety of topics such as military service, the responsibility of 
the government over the army, and use of resources. 
Today public opinion supports the abandonment of conscription and, by extension, 
supports the professionalization and modernisation of the NG (Efthymiou, 2014, 2015). 
The professional force provides technical rather than patriotic solutions to military 
threat. Thus, it does not necessitate community ties and emotional attachments to the 
defence of the country, which, as illustrated, are already significantly weakening. At 
the time of writing, the government is implementing a plan for gradual semi-
professionalization. However, as this change has come so late and is being implemented 
within the current condition of the NG, outlined above, the semi-professionalization 
essentially becomes entangled in the process of the disintegration of defence.  
 
7. Conclusion  
The post-war political leadership of the RoC has used various channels to formulate a 
response to the tragedy of the 1974 war both internally and internationally. Internally, 
it created a masculinised ‘nation-in-arms’ through means of cultural intervention, such 
as extensive presentation of defence issues in the national media and political discourse, 
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through the conscription of men from almost every family and through legal 
enforcement, such as defence tax. Internationally, the geographical size of ‘free’ Cyprus 
was transformed into a gendered, victimised state that sought the intervention of bigger 
political entities.  
The ideology of defence epitomises the national struggle that ensures the continuation 
of the GC existence on the island despite the presence of the ‘overly powerful enemy’, 
whilst ‘struggling’ to liberate North Cyprus through political negotiations and appeals 
to the international community. ‘Defence’ has been a formative discursive principle 
with a significant impact on the development of post-war GC community.  
Militarism is a deeply entrenched reality within the Cypriot context that provides for 
military solutions to national, political and social problems. The strong presence of 
militarism presents an everyday reality to Cypriots, militarism is a natural occurrence 
in GC perception and individuals are not concerned when regularly faced with military 
presence across the island (such as military vehicles or soldiers). In essence, Cyprus is 
camouflaged with six armies that have blended in the G.C. perception to the natural 
sceneries of the island.  
However, socio-political developments in recent years have had major impacts on the 
ideology of defence (Efthymiou, 2014, 2015, 2016). There has been a certain 
weakening of this internal response of ‘defence’ following the opening of the borders 
and the accession of the island to the European Union, as illustrated by the 
disinvestment of successive governments in ‘defence’ and the rise of social phenomena 
such as draft dodging. Indeed, many social and political groups in contemporary GC 
society are no longer willing to view ‘state security’ considerations as the primary 
criteria for national decision-making. Nor is GC society at large willing to grant the NG 
its previous status of unquestioned potency and professionalism. This article has 
provided an account of the development of GC militarism in Cyprus in the post-war 
years, setting a theoretical framework through the inquiry into the ideology of defence 
and providing a basis for future research.  
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